Reference and Extension by Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani & McGilvray, James
705
argument, the referent of  F is the function that maps the refer-
ent of  X onto the referent of  F ( X ). Th us, the referent of a complex 
expression is always the result of applying the referent of one of its 
constituents, as a function, to the referents of its other constitu-
ents, taken as arguments. Th e referent of a sentence as a whole is 
identifi ed with its truth value. Th us, the referent of “Chomsky” is 
Chomsky, the referent of “is clever” the function that maps each 
object  x onto  truth if  x is clever and onto  falsehood otherwise, and 
the referent (truth value) of “Chomsky is clever” is truth if and 
only if Chomsky is clever. 
 It may seem surprising that the referent of a sentence is its 
truth value, but it should be kept in mind that  reference is used as 
a technical concept within compositional semantics. Given the 
use to which the concept is put, this is not an unnatural assump-
tion: Frege was interested in a compositional semantics that 
would tell us how the truth values of sentences are determined 
by the referents of their parts, and all natural languages have 
fragments in which, when a sentence has  other sentences as parts, 
the truth value of the whole depends only on the truth values of 
the constituent sentences. Fragments of languages in which this 
is the case, and in which the referent of a complex expression 
in general depends only on the referents of its parts, are called 
 extensional . Th us, in an extensional fragment, expressions hav-
ing the same referent can be substituted in any sentence with-
out altering its truth value (contexts in which such substitutions 
preserve truth value are also called extensional). Frege was pri-
marily interested in constructing a semantics for the language 
of mathematics, which is extensional, and so choosing truth 
values as referents of sentences was natural. However, natural 
languages as wholes are not extensional. In contexts involving 
 propositional attitudes, modality , and counterfactuals, 
the substitution of clauses having the same truth value may alter 
the truth value of the whole sentence. To account for such con-
texts, Frege held that each sentence or other expression has, in 
addition to a referent, another kind of semantic value, which he 
called the expression’s  sense ( Sinn ). Th e sense of a sentence is 
what he called a  thought , or, in contemporary terms, a  propo-
sition . In order to maintain a version of the principle of  com-
positionality , he held that the truth values of nonextensional 
sentences are determined in part by the senses of their constitu-
ents (see  sense and reference ). 
 For various reasons, Frege’s approach is now considered anti-
quated. Most recent work in formal semantics for natural lan-
guages is inspired by  Alfred Tarski’s work on the defi nability of 
 TRUTH for formal languages. Richard Montague ( 1974 ) was the 
fi rst to apply Tarski’s work productively to (fragments of) natural 
languages. Here,  extension is the preferred term. Th e extension of 
a predicate is, again, the set of things to which it applies. Although 
terminology varies, in this framework, too, one can speak of the 
extension of almost any expression, including a sentence, so that 
one identifi es a sentence’s extension with its truth value. Applying 
Tarski’s approach, the aim is to recursively characterize not only 
the truth conditions of sentences but also the entailment (logi-
cal consequence) for a language using the notion of extension: A 
sentence S 1 is said to entail a sentence S 2 in language L if and only 
if there is no assignment of extensions to the semantically simple 
expressions of L (no “model of L”) under which S 1 is true and S 2 
false. On this approach, the logical constants diff er from other 
 Pinker ,  S. , and  R.  Jackendoff  . 2005. “ Th e faculty of language: What’s spe-
cial about it? ”  Cognition,  95 .2:  201 –36. 
 Stone ,  V. E. , and  P.  Gerrans . 2006. “ What’s domain-specifi c about theory 
of mind? ”  Social Neuroscience  1.3/4 :  309 –19. 
 Suddendorf ,  T. 1999. “Th e rise of the metamind.” In  Th e Descent of Mind , 
ed .  M.C.  Corballis and  S. E. G.  Lea , 218–60.  Oxford :  Oxford University 
Press . 
 ———. 2006. “ Foresight and evolution of the human mind .”  Science, 
 312 .5776 :  1006 –7. 
 Suh ,  E. 2007. “Recursion and interation.” Available online at: http://www.
aihorizon.com/essays/basiccs/general/recit.html. Retrieved from AI 
Horizon February 5, 2007. 
 REFERENCE AND EXTENSION 
 Extension and  reference are technical terms in the philosophy of 
language, formal semantics, and pragmatics. We outline their 
roles in three types of theoretical eff ort – compositional seman-
tic theories (which make use of both terms), various  theories of 
reference , which purport to tell us what it is for a word to have a 
certain referent, and views that understand reference as some-
thing people do with words. Th e fi rst two are semantic accounts; 
the last conceives of reference as a matter of language use, so of 
pragmatics. 
 Reference and Extension in Compositional Semantics 
 We begin with the use of reference and extension in composi-
tional semantic theories. In this domain a  referent is generally a 
thing that a proper noun “refers to” or “names,” and an exten-
sion a set of objects to which a predicate applies (the term  deno-
tation is sometimes used interchangeably with both reference 
and extension). However, compositional semanticists often gen-
eralize one or the other notion so that almost any kind of expres-
sion, including a sentence, can be said to have a referent or an 
extension. 
 With few exceptions, compositional semantic accounts are 
versions of  truth conditional semantics – attempts to 
specify the meanings of sentences in terms of their truth con-
ditions. Since natural languages allow for infi nitely many sen-
tences, the truth conditions of sentences must be specifi ed 
recursively in terms of the semantic values of their parts, and 
referents and extensions are semantic values that enable us to 
do just this. For example, we can specify the truth condition of 
the sentence “John smokes” in terms of the referents and exten-
sions of its parts as follows: “John smokes” is true if and only if 
the referent of “John” (namely, John himself) is a member of the 
extension of “smokes” (the set of things that smoke) . 
 Th e primary historical source for compositional semantics 
along these lines is Gottlob Frege’s ([ 1892 ] 1997) account of 
 Bedeutung – often translated as “reference” (also as “denota-
tion”). In it, a referent is assigned to every meaningful expres-
sion. Frege assumed that each complex expression is the result 
of combining a functional expression (such as a predicate) with 
one or more arguments (such as names) (see  predicate and 
argument ). Further, he assumed that the referent of a func-
tional expression  F is always a function  f , and that the referent 
of any expression  X that  F accepts as an argument is the sort 
of object that is among the arguments of  f . Specifi cally, if  F is a 
functional expression and  X an expression that  F accepts as an 
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maintain uniformity – to ensure “rigidity” in reference. In fact, 
speakers – paraphrasing Wittgenstein – play all sorts of games 
with language. 
 In taking reference as a form of action and treating  refer as 
a verb, we come closest to the commonsense idea of a person 
“referring to” or “talking about” an object. Critical work on 
Bertrand Russell’s analysis of  definite descriptions by 
P. F. Strawson ( 1950 ) and Keith Donnellan ( 1966 ), as well as 
H. Paul Grice’s work on the semantics/pragmatics distinction, 
inspired a distinction between  speaker’s reference and  semantic 
reference , the latter being central to both compositional seman-
tics and theories of reference of the sorts considered in the pre-
vious section. Th e speaker’s reference of an expression, on an 
occasion, is whatever object that speaker uses the expression to 
pick out, typically in order to assert (query, etc.) something about 
that object. You may use the phrase “the man drinking a mar-
tini” to refer to a certain person, although the person you have in 
mind is, unbeknownst to you, drinking water: He is not, then, the 
semantic referent of the phrase. 
 Some writers hold that semantic reference either does not 
exist (Strawson  1950 can be read this way), or – if it is to sus-
tain theoretical investigation – must be reconceived (Chomsky). 
Chomsky points out that natural language use (not in-house use 
of the symbols of mathematics or natural science, where practi-
tioners constrain their actions) displays “creativity,” where this 
is thought of in terms not only of the uncaused production of 
novel expressions but also of their free use for any number of 
purposes (“appropriateness”). Because referring is a form of 
free action and cannot sustain naturalistic study, Chomsky pro-
poses the elimination of the semantic study of natural languages 
as usually conceived (off ering theories of word–world relation-
ships), placing the study of reference in a part of pragmatics 
that resists theoretical investigation, and placing the study of 
what he calls “meaning” (a psycholinguistic version of Fregean 
senses) in syntax broadly conceived as the study of the intrinsic 
properties of the mind/brain. Th e study of meaning – semantics 
reconceived – becomes a psycholinguistic enterprise focusing 
on the natures of mind-internal elements, such as lexical items, 
their “semantic features,” and the computations in which they 
fi gure. Chomsky ( 2000 , 38 f) points out that this kind of study 
might employ a theoretical device called “relation R,” construed 
as a postulated relationship between theoretically defi ned 
expressions and objects in some introduced, stipulated domain. 
Relation R is not reference “outside the head” that is not apt 
for naturalistic study. Relation R and the domain D are, rather, 
construed to be part of syntax – theoretical devices aiding the 
naturalistic study of syntax conceived as “language in the head.” 
Th e members of D could be stipulated to be semantic values. 
Th is might allow Chomsky to absorb the insights of Montague 
and other developing theories within  formal semantics into 
syntax. It would also emphasize a view Chomsky maintains for 
other reasons: Semantic compositionality is syntactic computa-
tion. Whether absorbing formal semantic accounts of composi-
tionality in this way suits the intuitions and aims of those who 
want their semantic eff orts to provide explications of truth con-
ditions is another matter . 
 – James  McGilvray and  Juhani  Yli-Vakkuri 
expressions in that they are not assigned extensions/referents 
(see  logic and language ). 
 Montague’s approach diff ers notably from Frege’s: It does 
not assign senses to expressions to account for nonextensional 
contexts.  Instead, it employs the tools of  possible worlds 
semantics to this end. One can, however, within Montague’s 
framework defi ne objects corresponding roughly to Frege’s 
senses: Th e sense of an expression could be thought to corre-
spond to the function that maps each possible world onto the 
extension that the expression has in that world. Such functions 
are often called  intensions (see  intension and extension ) . 
 Theories of Reference, New and Old 
 Th e second set of theories (often called theories of reference) 
in which the terms  reference and  extension are found appear in 
the works of philosophers of language who aim to describe and 
explain the word–world relations that compositional semantic 
theories of the sort discussed previously take for granted. 
 In this area, too, a classical source is Frege. According to 
Frege, a word has a specifi c referent because its users associate it 
with a particular sense – something like a conceptual represen-
tation of its referent. Applied to proper names, his view was that 
a name, say, “George W. Bush,” is associated by its users with a 
certain descriptive condition, say,  being the 43d president of the 
United States , and that its referent is that object (if any) which 
uniquely satisfi es this condition. 
 Another view, the so-called new theory of reference (in vogue 
since the 1970s), maintains that at least some expressions do 
not have senses, but simply refer. Proper names are paradigm 
examples. According to the approach, what cements the relation 
between a name and its referent is not a mediating conceptual 
representation in the speaker’s mind but a causal and historical 
relationship between the name’s user and its referent. Th e idea, 
articulated by Kripke (1972), is that a name is introduced by an 
initial “baptism,” which involves a causal interaction between a 
speaker and the referent itself, and reference for all other speakers 
is preserved in chains of communication in which each speaker 
intends to use the name to refer to the same object as those from 
which he or she acquired the name. Extending Kripke’s view in 
ways suggested by Kripke himself, Hilary Putnam ( 1975 ) pro-
posed baptism + history as an account of how  natural kind 
terms come to have and maintain their extensions (see  essen-
tialism and meaning ) . 
 Reference as Action 
 Th e third view we discuss maintains that reference depends 
essentially on individual speakers (and possibly interpreters) 
with variable interests: An appropriate slogan might be “Words 
don’t refer; people do.” One root of this view is found in the 
work of the later Ludwig Wittgenstein, another in Descartes. 
Th ose who defend it point out that it is diffi  cult to fi nd cases 
of uniform word–world relationships in the use of natural lan-
guages. Th ey grant that the practices of mathematicians dis-
play uniformity, but these practices aside, reference varies 
with time, context, speaker’s interests, and so on. Th ey also 
grant that some who off er theories of reference, such as Kripke 
(1972), acknowledge a role for speaker intentions. But Kripke 
and others incorrectly assume that ordinary speakers desire to 
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morphology: subject-verb  agreement ,  person ,  number , and 
gender (see  gender marking agreement (French, German, 
and Turkish); the switch-reference system (Amele); or topic/
subject markers (Japanese).  Discourse analysis (see  discourse 
analysis [linguistic]) fi nds that reference usage follows the 
constraints of information fl ow: Th e grammatical subject of a 
transitive clause tends to be coded with a pronoun in English, or 
zero anaphora in Chinese or Japanese, to present given or acces-
sible information ( the light subject constraint ), for instance, “He” 
in the example, whereas the grammatical object tends to be an 
NP carrying new information (e.g., one plant). Th is allows easy 
processing of accessible information early in an utterance, while 
the rest of the utterance introduces the new referent, thus facili-
tating reference tracking and discourse processing . 
 Experimental studies fi nd that the discourse pattern of a 
language engenders specifi c reference tracking strategies in its 
native speakers. Th erefore, speakers of diff erent languages may 
develop diff erent cognitive strategies to track reference during 
discourse processes . 
 – Liang  Tao 
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 REGISTER 
 Speakers of a language use diff erent words and grammatical 
structures in diff erent communicative situations. For example, 
we do not use the same words and structures to write an aca-
demic term paper that we would use when talking to a close 
friend about weekend plans. 
 Researchers study the language used in a particular situation 
under the rubric of  register : a language variety defi ned by its situ-
ational characteristics, including the setting, interactiveness, the 
channel (or mode) of communication, the production and pro-
cessing circumstances, the purposes of communication, and the 
topic. 
 Although registers are defi ned in situational terms, they can 
also be described in terms of their typical linguistic characteris-
tics; most linguistic features are functional and, therefore, they 
tend to occur in registers with certain situational characteristics. 
For example, fi rst and second person pronouns ( I and  you ) are 
especially common in conversation. Speakers in conversation 
talk a lot about themselves, and so they commonly use the pro-
noun  I . Th ese speakers also interact directly with another person, 
often using the pronoun  you . 
 Th ere are many studies that describe the characteristics of 
a particular register, such as sports announcer talk (Ferguson 
 1983 ), note taking (Janda  1985 ), classifi ed advertising (Bruthiaux 
 1996 ), and scientifi c writing (Halliday  1988 ).  Other researchers 
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 REFERENCE TRACKING 
 Reference tracking, or  ANAPHORA resolution, concerns how 
language users track who or what the speaker is referring to in 
discourse. Because everyday language use generally concerns 
who does what to whom, reference tracking is important in 
studying human language and cognition. 
 Anaphora devices include noun phrases (NPs), pronouns, 
and zero anaphora, whose identities depend on their anteced-
ents in discourse. In the example “Isabel went to China, and this 
volunteer/she helped with midwifery training,” “Th is volunteer” 
is an NP that refers back to its antecedent Isabel. It could be 
replaced by the pronoun  she or by an empty slot (zero anaphora) 
as in the sentence “Isabel went to China and ____ helped with 
midwifery training.” 
 Pronouns and zero anaphora give less explicit information 
than full NPs. Still, the reader/hearer benefi ts from the effi  ciency 
of these devices in conveying information that has been intro-
duced/given in the prior discourse or can be accessed/inferred 
from the context. Th ese devices are crucial for global cohesion 
and local coherence in discourse. Experimental studies fi nd that 
without a specifi c need, replacing a pronoun with an NP for given 
information may hinder understanding . 
 A discourse topic provides a basic means for tracking the 
identity of a pronoun or zero anaphora because the topic tends 
to recur as given information continuously. Cross-linguistic 
studies fi nd that people can track the identity of a pronoun or 
zero anaphora even when its referent is not in the immediately 
preceding clause but in the prior context. Th erefore, although 
language production may be linear due to human physical limi-
tations, language processing and reference tracking are hierar-
chical cognitive processes. 
 Reference tracking requires the hearer to make inferences 
from world knowledge about likely events, especially for lan-
guages that have no  morphological markings (Chinese) yet 
allow abundant zero anaphora, as in “He grew only one plant, 
but ___ blossomed well.” Many languages make reference track-
ing easier with specifi c grammatical markings, such as agreement 
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